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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EARL C. FREIS, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 14184 
WHEELER MACHINERY COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising out 
of a collision between the truck-tractor in which the plain-
tiff was sitting and a caterpillar tractor loaded on a 
trailer being pulled by an employee of the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On a verdict of no cause of action by the jury, the 
lower court entered judgment of no cause of action in favor 
of the defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks affirmance of the judgment of the 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant's statement of facts is incomplete and 
inaccurate and omits most of the facts favorable to the ver-
dict of the jury. The facts upon which the jury verdict is 
based are as follows: 
On January 23, 1973, Rodney K. Bosch, a transport 
driver, employed by defendant Wheeler Machinery Company, was 
hauling a D-8 Cat from Wyoming to defendant's shop in Salt 
Lake City (TR. 41). Defendant's driver was pulling 120,000 
pounds on a three-axle, lowboy trailer (TR. 54). Mr. Bosch 
was driving at a speed approximately 50 miles per hour as he 
approached the accident area (TR. 47). At this point, just 
north of the crest of the hill, he saw a patrol car parked 
with flashing lights sitting at the side of the road when he 
was approximately one-fourth of a mile north of the patrol 
car (TR. 48). At this time, he applied the brakes a little 
but did not try to stop (TR. 49). He continued on southbound, 
driving in the inside lane. 
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No flares were out at the patrol car (TR. 29) and 
when Mr. Bosch passed the patrol car, no signal to slow or 
stop was given to him (TR. 408). 
The statements of Mr. Bosch (TR. 361) and Mr. Morton, 
the Farmington City Marshal, the driver of the patrol car 
stopped north of the crest of the hill, show that plaintiff's 
attorney, at the time he arranged to have photos used as ex-
hibits, placed the patrol car about 100 to 150 feet west and 
not at the point where it was observed by Mr. Bosch (TR. 117). 
Mr. Morton, the Farmington City Marshal, testified to the 
effect that where he was stopped, he could not see the earlier 
accident at the intersection of U.S. 8 9 and the Farmington 
junction and that he did not know that cars had stopped block-
ing both lanes and backing up the hill behind where Mr. Freis 
stopped his tractor and trailers. Traffic was blocked for 
one-fourth of a mile behind Mr. Freis (TR. 83). 
About 100 feet south and west of the patrol car, 
Mr. Bosch crested the hill and saw the lines of cars stopped 
in both southbound lanes ahead blocking each lane on U.S. 8 9 
(TR. 47). At this point, Mr. Bosch estimated his speed was 
40 miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone (TR. 57). 
3 
Mr. Bosch had a heavy load and decided rather than 
to try and stop, he would avoid a collision by turning to 
his left and going over the island separating the two north-
bound lanes from the two southbound lanes. The island was 
covered with ice and snow (TR. 31). He never tried to brake 
or stop on the dry pavement used by Officer Lord, plaintiff's 
expert in making plaintiff's calculations. 
Mr. Bosch got the left front wheel of the tractor and 
the left wheels of the lowboy over the island and onto the 
snow, but the right front wheel caught the edge of the island 
and refused to go up on the island or across. Thereafter, on 
the ice and snow, Mr. Bosch, with his tractor and lowboy, rode 
the island passing the stopped vehicles on the left. All 
vehicles were passed without contact that were backed up be-
hind plaintiff's tractor and trailers (TR. 51). As Mr. Bosch's 
lowboy went past on the left side of plaintiff's double 
trailers and tractor cab, a portion of the D-8 Cat sliced 
open the aluminum skin of the double trailers and bumped the 
cab which plaintiff was sitting in on the left side. 
There is no evidence that the plaintiff's tractor cab 
was moved in the impact. Trooper Boelter, the investigating 
officer, said he saw no indication that the truck of Mr. Freis 
was moved in the impact (TR. 32). Trooper Boelter also said 
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that Mr. Freis told him that he was not injured (TR. 33, 302) 
and that he saw no indication of any injury on Mr. Freis 
(TR. 39). ; 
Mr. Freis' testimony showed that at the time of the 
accident he had been stopped for about ten minutes with all 
air brakes on all axles on both double trailers locked up 
with 90 pounds of air (TR. 188, 298). 
Although Mr. Freis was a union steward and familiar 
with employee rights and working within the scope of his em-
ployment, he waited fourteen months, or until after March of 
1974, to report to Mr. Millsap, his supervisor for Western 
Gillette, that he was injured in this accident (TR. 303). 
Although Mr. Freis admitted missing some working days 
between the date of the accident, January 23, 1973, and March 1 
1974, he never once, prior to March of 1974, claimed he was 
injured in the accident to Mr. Millsap (TR. 304). 
Mr. Millsap, the supervisor for Western Gillette, 
went to the scene of the accident immediately and arrived 
before vehicles were moved. 
At the scene of the accident, Mr. Millsap, at the 
rear of the trailers, had a conversation with plaintiff and 
Mr. Dinger, the relief driver, and he was told by Mr. Freis 
that he, Freis, was not hurt (TR. 333, 336). 
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During the trial, Mr. Millsap was questioned by the 
Court as to what was said by Mr. Freis at the accident scene 
and after the Court was satisfied as to the witness1 recollec-
tion, Mr. Millsap stated: 
"I am reasonably certain that Mr. Freis 
stated, when I asked him if it didn't shake 
him up when the truck hit him and he replied, 
fI didn't feel the thing hit. I just heard a 
lot of racket, looked out the window and there 
went the mirror1". (TR. 343). 
Dr. Thomas D. Noonan, an orthopedic surgeon, did an 
independent medical examination on the plaintiff prior to 
trial. Dr. Noonan examined x-rays of plaintiff taken on 
March 19, 1974, and November 25, 1974 (TR. 373). On April 2, 
197 5, Dr. Noonan took x-rays of the plaintiff (TR. 374) . 
Dr. Noonan found that the plaintiff had degenerative 
osteoarthritis prior to the accident (TR. 375). He estimated 
that this condition had existed for four or five years prior 
to the time he saw the plaintiff on April 2, 1975 (TR. 376). 
Dr. Noonan stated that without regard to the accident on 
January 23, 1973, surgery would have been required by the plai] 
tiff to remove the pre-existing bone spurs. He stated: 
"My opinion is that the surgery that was per-
formed would have been required regardless of 
whether any intervening event had taken place 
including this accident on January 23, 197 3." 
(TR. 377, 378). 
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proLruaed disc or t'm t he had a cervical strain relating to 
the accident. 
'\j. hi. doonan, from \ ,jr examination of t..-_ 
X-rays, your examination of vie patient, the 
hospital records, do you have an opinion as to 
whether •-" y l ulmi - mar. ha" hrd a protrude?-:; i::i-*';) 
i-.. J d-.;..'*. believe he did. --ou]d have t- look 
at the operative notes for specifics. 
<^. i_»o^ r, a^ uiK. u p o r a t l V O L-:p;'. -: :h •• V:e 
have got it in evidence. 
;,, Bu( T don't believe he r? i r?.. 
i •)! obriin -^  : is raster than me. 
; . Th<> oneratinq surgeon does not describe on^. 
VO- H O v , ; i J U ^ J l ' J ! . , c t b S l l i i l l . i g t . : O . S i . ^ . I ^ O I J w-* 
the date or? the accident gave a history of not 
having been injured that da;., assume further 
that his statement: to !•!r' * * illsap who came out 
there was: 'I didn't feel it hit at that time,1 
assuming that he went fourteen months after the 
day of the accident before he ever complained 
t. o his employer, won] J yos have sin opinion as 
' to whether or not based on that history that he 
had a cervical strain arising Crom the accident 
on January 23, 1973? 
7-.. Y.-s. T ,/ould. 
A. 1 believe to have a cervical strain he 
would have fr-lt something, It1 would have been 
aw a ^ o s f" '• "*" 
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Q. And if he did not he would not have a 
cervical strain? 
A. That's correct." 
Dr. Gary Larsen said there was nothing he could see, 
in March of 1974, when he first examined the plaintiff, that 
told him that Mr. Freis was injured in an accident on 
January 23, 1973 (TR. 235). 
Dr. Larsen stated he had to depend entirely on the 
history given by Mr. Freis and as the history was not accurate, 
then his diagnosis based on it might not be correct (TR. 235). 
Dr. Larsen agreed with Dr. Noonan that the bone spurs 
probably pre-existed the accident (TR. 241, 242) . He also 
said the bone spurs that pre-existed could have caused the 
numbness in plaintiff's upper extremity (TR. 243). He also 
admitted that not giving a history of neck injury until 
eight or ten days after the accident was unusual. He said 
that symptoms would usually show up on the day of the acci-
dent or two or three days afterward. He finally admitted he 
never saw a protruded disc on x-ray examinations or in the 
operation and that the myelogram defect that he did see could 
have been caused by a bone spur (TR. 255). 
Plaintiff, in Requested Instruction No. 5 (R. 107), 
requested that the question of defendant's negligence be 
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submitted to tdu: jury and in substance, this request was 
ARGUMENT 
POliV 'i'Hli iSbUh OE bZr'Li^JAI^t ' S EEGEIGENCE, 
IF AtE, , BEING A PEOXIMATL, CAUSE Of 
THE ACCIDENT WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED 
TO THE Jlltv. 
hindsight. 
Outsicie -* .. ;,
 tjiness as:: .:. si,;-:a:_ ;= -
nut anticipated that traffic will stop or block the main 
por ti or of a roadway. 
I E ' ' - e ' ....: :tows that as he approached the 
patro" -:ai" parkin"! a the s ido of l. \ .- rend by x*r . Morton, the 
ahead was blocked 'hereafter, he ere =3 ted the hi I:., Having 
s 1 o w c v i ^ ^  -.; n e o a,. o u t i 0 m 11 e s p e r 1 1 o u 1: , a 1 1 d F f * 11"< >< : I ' } > • ::' f 1|! • - * ^  h 
southbound lanes were blocked by vehicles stopped :or an 
earlier accident-. Mr. Boscl 1, 2 1 1 the second or u.\ a\a _.__aale, 
elected rather than to try and stop for tae vehicles biock-
i no hi: lane and risk hitting one or more •_•:. I h^ip, to t-nrp. 
1
 f I: ai i« I go ov ^ r the raised island tiiat 
separated t he northbound two lanes fror. the southbound two 
iau •. - • ade tl le 1 a en re , 1 le fo : • •' ' .;,,... 
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it because once he got the left wheels up on the snow and 
ice on the island, he did not have enough traction to pull 
the right wheels off the ice and onto the island. Quickly 
thereafter, he found that because of the ice and snow on the 
island and the ice at the edge of the island on the north 
side and the edge of the inside southbound lane that stop-
ping quickly to the rear of plaintiff's tractor and double 
trailers was no longer an option. 
There are many exceptions to the Dalley rule. In 
Wright v. Maynard, 120 Utah 504, 235 P.2d 916 (1951), under 
Circumstances quite similar to this case, this Court re-
versed a lower court that directed liability against the 
defendant for failing to stop when the defendant had adequate 
time to make a judgment and swerve. In Wright v. Maynard, 
supra, at about 6:30 p.m. on January 14, 1949, the defendant 
was driving an automobile north on Highway 91 to the City of 
Orem. The road was covered with ice and very slick and 
slippery. The night was clear and there were no obstructions 
to vision. After he rounded a bend, his lights disclosed an 
unlighted vehicle protruding into the highway on the side in 
which he was traveling with a man in white coveralls standing 
next to it. Mr. Maynard immediately applied his brakes but 
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due he <: • _i_cw , his car commenced to slide toward tho other 
car an^ the man, '^ I'-Jivai't.oj;, :w.- d.;ticwt • -•-•--•r^ . ,!. ) tne 
shouldcj. ol the roadway and -just as ho did GO, tbw tright 
jumped in front o" ni.-.. i:. tin- cr_ :'L, •. :I-: . : ec i <: 1 
] sal.-' : .j.fainst Mi. Maynard because ho j-jjld nob .-.top i ;-. 
tiio range or i\.i t light-;. This Court- reversed saying; 
In the instant case, tiie facts arc different. 
Although appellant was not able to stop wittwi 
the distance, he could observe substantial 
objects in front: of him, sLi.ll he saw them in 
time and had sufficient control of his car to 
turn aside and avoid running into them had they 
remained stationary, Had respondent herein not 
moved from his position nea ' tho door of the 
stalled car and jumped to the east as appellant 
swerved his car to the east, appellant would 
have avoided hitting him. Under such a state 
of fact.;.;, t h e p r j no L p 1 e s enunciated in LI u • 
Nikoloropoulos and Daliey cases do not appl\. 
Even though appellant may have been driving too 
fast under existing conditions to stop in time 
to avoid hitting substantial objects disclosed 
by hi. 5: on ;'l Igh t s had he kepL on a straight 
course, still such inability to stop where he 
had the ability to avoid a collision with those 
objects by some other means, such as turning 
aside, presents a different question from that-
decided in the two previous cases above referred 
to. It was a question for the jury to deter-
mine whether his inability to stop was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident or whether that cause 
was tho unexpected change of position by plaintiff. 
The court therefore erred in ruling as a matter 
of lav; that appellant's negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the respondent's injuries. 
Driving 1 tractor pulling n~ overload makes stopping 
iai more difficult than an ordinal ' vehicle. If the driver 
of a truck, such as Mr. Bosch, drove so slow as to always 
be able to stop in any emergency, he certainly would block 
a lot of traffic behind. There is no evidence that the brakes 
were bad or that stopping was difficult because of poor 
mechanical condition of the defendant's tractor and trailer. 
There is no evidence of speed; at the time he saw the stopped, 
traffic ahead, he was going approximately 40 miles per hour 
in a 65 mile per hour zone. He had an accident because he 
did not anticipate that the ice and snow on the island and 
next to the island would make it impossible for him to 
safely go over into the oncoming lane. 
Negligence should not be predicated upon the wrong 
evasive action taken in an emergency. In Howard v. Ringsby 
Truck Lines, 2 U.2d 65, 269 P.2d 295 (1954), a truck driver 
was suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with an emergency, 
a vehicle that came into his lane. The truck driver for Ringsb; 
was loaded with explosives and took two or three seconds to 
try and decide what to do and in that time, he lost the point 
of being able to stop short of an impact. The driver might 
also have avoided a collision by turning slightly to the right. 
Nevertheless, the court sustained a judgment for the defendant 
saying that the showing of a mere possibility that an accident 
might have been avoided had the defendant pursued different 
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•conduct is insufficient to support a finding that the 
defendant was negligent. 
In the instant case, it is clear that the evidence was 
adequate to support a jury verdict for the plaintiff if the 
jury had found for the plaintiff. It is also true that the 
location of the patrol car, and the question of what signal, 
if any, was given, were in dispute and that the impact with 
the plaintiff's tractor occurred not because of the speed and 
the distance the defendant driver was from plaintiff's trailers 
when the emergency was noted but rather because of the evasive 
action he took in turning onto the island. 
In Bullock v. Ungricht, '—U,2d—, 538 P. 2d 190 (1975), 
the court submitted both the issue of defendant's negligence 
and plaintiff's contributory negligence to a jury where the 
defendant collided with the rear of the.plaintiff's vehicle 
on December 16, 1971. The jury returned a no cause of action 
verdict for the defendant and against the plaintiff. The 
evidence showed that the defendant, the following driver, got 
no signal that the vehicle ahead was going to stop until the 
vehicle ahead was stopping. The court in affirming a judgment 
for the defendant on the submission of the issues to the jury 
said: 
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This court has often affirmed the proposi-
tion that unless the facts relating to 
negligence and contributory negligence are 
so free from doubt: that reasonable minds 
could not differ thereon a jury question 
exists, and if there is doubt about the matter, 
it should be resolved in favor of according 
the parties the right of trial by jury of those 
disputed issues. In harmony of that rule, under 
the circumstances as described above, we are not 
persuaded to disagree with the judgment of the 
trial court that there was a basis in evidence 
upon which reasonable minds could find either 
way on the issue of defendant's negligence and 
plaintiff's contributory negligence and, there-
fore, properly allowed the jury those issues to 
determine. 
Since the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiff, the defendant on this 
appeal is entitled to have the Court consider the evidence 
and all inferences that may dawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. The jury may have believed 
that for the defendant's vehicle to have been going more slowlj 
would have been more hazardous to traffic on the highway than 
its speed of 4 0 miles per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone and 
hence, concluded defendant was not negligent. The defendant 
is not an insurer of the safety of all drivers of vehicles 
ahead. 
POINT II: DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT WAS NOT THE 
PROXIiMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURIES 
OF WHICH PLAINTIFF COMPLAINED. 
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At the time Mr. Freis claimed he was injured, he 
was sitting in a vehicle that was anchored to the highway 
by 90 pounds of air on five axles of air brakes that were 
set. His vehicle was not moved by the impact. 
Plaintiff told everyone at the scene of the accident 
he was not hurt. He told Mr. Millsap that he didn!t feel it 
hit but, "there went the side mirror". He told the police 
officer that he was not injured. He waited fourteen months 
before he told his employer that he claimed he was injured. 
His own doctor, Dr. Larsen, said if you have a cervical strain, 
the symptoms usually show up the day, or two or three days, 
after. He did not give a history of any symptoms or com-
plaints within that period and first indicated, fourteen 
months later, that he had a history of pain eight or ten days 
after the accident in the hospital records. Dr. Thomas D. 
Noonan, on examination, found that he had pre-existing osteo-
arthritis, and that it existed for four or five years prior 
to the time he first saw him and prior to the time of the 
accident. He further testified that because he did not have 
a history of pain at the time in the cervical neck that it 
was his opinion that he did not have a cervical strain and 
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said that from his examination of the records, he did not 
have a protruded cervical disc. He related his need for 
surgery to the pre-existing condition and said he would have 
required surgery because of the pre-existing condition regard-
less of whether or not there was an accident. Dr. Larsen, 
plaintiff's doctor, admitted that the defect he saw on the 
myelogram x-ray could have been a bone spur and conceded he 
saw no protruded disc. 
The evidence in this case as to whether or not the 
plaintiff was injured was very controversial. In Pauley v. 
Zarbock, 29 U.2d 30, 504 P.2d 999 (1970), on a case involving 
controversial testimony, this Court said: 
The evidence here was controversial. We have 
said that negligence, contributory negligence 
and proximate cause are jury questions. Be-
lievable evidence shows that plaintiff has had 
accidents before this case, and one after, where 
she suffered injuries requiring some sort of 
medication. 
Plaintiff recounts parts of the record favor-
able to her position. We review the case, not 
in the light favorable to plaintiff, but to the 
conclusion of the jury. Doing so, we agree with 
the jury verdict, which, on believable, admis-
sible evidence, fully supports the verdict. 
Affirmed with costs to respondent. 
In Pollesche v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 27 U.2d 
430, 497, P.2d 236 (1972), Mrs. Patterson, the driver of the 
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following vehicle, stated that a child apparently standing 
on the front seat of the Pollesche vehicle was not changed 
from this position by the force of the impact. Mr. Pollesche 
testified that in two prior accidents he had sustained back 
injuries and his testimony showed that he claimed he was 
going a little less than 25 miles per hour at the time of 
impact. 
The testimony of a medical expert regarding Mrs. Pollesc] 
showed that in an earlier trial, he testified that on reason-
able medical certainty, an earlier accident was responsible 
for the lesion and need for surgery that he previously per-
formed. This made the question as to what injury was received 
in the second accident very controversial. In commenting on 
this situation, this Court said: 
A large measure of discretion is vested in the 
trial court in refusing or granting a motion for 
a new trial on the ground that there is an in-
sufficiency of the evidence to support the ver-
dict and judgment. This court cannot substitute 
its discretion for that of the trial court, and 
this court will not interfere with such rulings, 
unless the abuse of, or failure to exercise, dis-
cretion on the part of the trial judge is clearly 
shown. If, upon examination of the evidence as 
disclosed by the record, it is apparent that there 
is a substantial conflict of evidence as to 
material issues of fact in the case relative 
to which the insufficiency is alleged, this court 
must hold as a matter of law that no abuse of dis-
cretion is shown. 
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In the instant case, there is ample evidence to show 
that the jury and the trial court had cause to believe the 
plaintiff's injuries and need for surgery was not proximately 
caused by the accident on January 23, 1973. 
CONCLUSION 
As all reasonable men might not draw the same con-
clusion from the evidence on the issue of negligence, and on 
the issue of whether the defendant's negligence, if any, 
proximately caused the injuries of which plaintiff complained, 
the issues were properly submitted to the jury and the judgmem 
of the lower court must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, this 23rd day of December, 
1975. 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
BV nfl*^'^'%.(&»~j 
Raymonft/M. B e r r y / 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-9000 
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foregoing Brief of Respondent by mailing two copies thereof, 
postage prepaid, to Mr. Lyle J. Barnes, Attorney for Plain-
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